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ABSTRACT 
A naturalist wanting to understand our conscious experience of free will may find it 
difficult to judge exactly what content is present in that experience. I provide an approach for 
how naturalistic theories of consciousness can be used to go about that, and then I apply David 
Rosenthal’s HOT theory to that approach. After explaining HOT theory’s framework, I review 
the literature on the experience of free will in order to identify which items of content of the 
experience are libertarian and which are compatibilist. I then use HOT theory to show how 
various mental states interact to produce content associated with the experience of libertarian 
free will. Since the naturalist can’t accept libertarian metaphysics, the conclusion is that the 
experience of free will is illusory. I end by addressing concerns with that conclusion, including 
the question of why it is that we still feel free. 
 
INDEX WORDS: free will, consciousness, HOT theory, libertarianism, compatibilism, 
phenomenology, content, conditions of satisfaction, free will skepticism 
  
FREE WILL EXPERIENCES AND HIGHER-ORDER THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
KYLE ALAN HALE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Kyle Alan Hale 
2020  
FREE WILL EXPERIENCES AND HIGHER-ORDER THOUGHTS 
 
 
by 
 
 
KYLE ALAN HALE 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Eddy Nahmias 
 
Committee: Jessica N. Berry 
Neil Van Leeuwen 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Services 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
August 2020  
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
For Taylor.
v 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thank you to Eddy Nahmias for talking through all permutations of this argument, as 
well as Jessica Berry and Neil Van Leeuwen for their keen comments. I’m also indebted to 
Nathan Palmer for our many conversations on these and other topics.
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ V 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... VII 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 
2 ROSENTHAL’S HOT THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS .......................................... 6 
2.1 Understanding HOT Theory ....................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Empirical support for HOT theory .......................................................................... 10 
3 THE FEATURES OF FREE WILL EXPERIENCES ................................................ 14 
3.1 Agent as cause ............................................................................................................. 14 
3.2 Ability to do otherwise ............................................................................................... 16 
4 HOT THEORY AND LIBERTARIAN PHENOMENOLOGY ................................. 18 
4.1 Agent as cause ............................................................................................................. 19 
4.2 Ability to do otherwise ............................................................................................... 24 
4.3 Summary of the experience of free will .................................................................... 27 
5 SKEPTICISM: CONCERNS AND ADVANTAGES .................................................. 30 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 37 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Features of the experience of free will ........................................................................... 18 
  
 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We continuously experience ourselves as freely choosing to act. While I am out for a walk, for 
example, I may come upon a path that splits off down a hillside. The choice to walk down that 
new path has a certain feeling to it, the feeling of the choice itself, in addition to the feeling of 
the steps or the path beneath my feet. Furthermore, if I choose to kick a rock and send it rolling 
down the hill in front of me, the relationship between that choice and the movements of my leg 
feels different to me than the relationship between my shoe and the movements of the rock. What 
is that difference? Is it that I choose my movements freely while the rock’s are caused by an 
outside force, my shoe? If so, what does it mean to choose them freely? Or are my movements 
caused by outside forces like the rock’s are, such that I do not choose freely at all? If I don’t have 
such freedom, why do I still feel like I do? 
These phenomenological questions are about the content of a conscious experience. 
Content is related to, but not the same as, the objects of our experience. In the simple example of 
a visual experience, if I see a rock in front of me, the phenomenal content is not the object, the 
rock itself. Rather, the content is my perception of size, color, and shape, all of which are a part 
of my visual experience that there is a rock in front of me. As this suggests, the experience of 
seeing a rock involves not just the perception of a rock as a whole but also of its size, color, 
shape, etc. Thus we can speak of an experience’s content as a whole as well as its discrete items 
of content. Furthermore, a conscious experience has conditions of satisfaction (Searle, 1983) 
which are associated with the content of the experience: if an item of content (such as the visual 
experience of grayness) corresponds to a feature of an object in the actual world (such as the 
color of a rock in front of me), that condition is satisfied; otherwise, it is not satisfied. Thus, any 
conscious experience can go one of two ways: if its conditions of satisfaction are met, it is a 
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veridical experience; if they are not met, it is an illusory experience. A veridical experience is 
one in which the phenomenological (how it appears) matches the metaphysical (how it actually 
is). 
A veridical experience of free will may also be divided into two categories: either the 
experience has wholly compatibilist content or it has at least some libertarian content. The 
compatibilists think we have free will that is compatible with a deterministic physical world 
(e.g., Frankfurt, 1969; Strawson, 1962), and the libertarians think we have free will that is 
incompatible with determinism (e.g., Clarke, 1993; Kane, 1996). This disagreement is a 
metaphysical one, but it has a phenomenological correlate: while some libertarians and 
compatibilists agree that the experience of free will is veridical, they disagree about the 
experience’s content and conditions of satisfaction (Bayne, 2008; Horgan, 2015). Thus, they will 
come to different answers to the questions about my experience to choose to walk down the hill. 
A naturalist asking these questions will want to explain conscious experiences in 
naturalistic terms, where naturalism is the metaphysical view that everything is matter and that 
all its interactions are due to natural laws and forces. A compatibilist with this naturalistic 
motivation might say that some libertarian explanations of conscious experiences make 
metaphysical commitments that can’t be accounted for naturalistically, and then go on to try to 
give such a naturalistic explanation. One thing that the compatibilist can do to provide this 
explanation is to reject some of the phenomenal content that the libertarian claims to be 
necessary to the experience of free will. However, this rejection is arbitrary unless there is a 
standard for judging what content is actually present in the experience of free will and what is 
not. In order for a naturalist to judge what content is present, they need two things: (a) a 
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naturalistic theory of consciousness that lets them say when an item of content is present in an 
experience, and (b) a list of candidate items of content. 
This sets up the first two of three claims of my overall argument: 
 
C1: Given a sufficiently thorough list (b) of candidate items of content of the experience of 
free will, any theory of consciousness meeting the criteria of (a) can be used to produce a 
sub-list (c) of actual items of content in the experience of free will. 
C2: Sub-list (c) is composed in part of those items of content that the compatibilist rejects, 
and so the experience of free will has libertarian conditions of satisfaction. 
 
For (a), the theory of consciousness, some naturalists will be inclined to turn to David 
Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory (Rosenthal, 1986, 1997, 2005). It meets the 
criteria; it is friendly to naturalistic accounts of the world (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 339), and its 
framework allows one to reason about the phenomenal content of one’s conscious experiences. A 
full defense of C1 would require considering many competing theories of consciousness, but that 
is outside the scope of my overall argument here. I will instead be defending a narrower version 
C1ʹ where HOT theory is provided for (a). While I do think that the broader claim C1 can be 
defended using other theories of consciousness, the choice of HOT theory as a starting place for 
my argument is not arbitrary. In addition to meeting the criteria above, it has strong empirical 
support relative to other theories of consciousness. I will therefore outline both the explanatory 
framework that HOT theory provides and the empirical research supporting its use. 
To produce (b), the list of candidate items of content, I will consult some recent literature 
on the phenomenology of free will and agency. In order to provide as thorough a list as possible, 
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this literature will include both libertarian and compatibilist phenomenological accounts. The 
literature focuses on two features of the phenomenology: the agent as cause, and the ability to do 
otherwise. There are candidate items of content for both of these features, some of which are 
associated with libertarian conditions of satisfaction and some compatibilist. I will filter each 
candidate item of content through the perspective of HOT theory to produce (c) the list of items 
of content that are actually present in the experience, and will then show that some of them are 
associated with libertarian conditions of satisfaction. C2, then, will be defended in light of C1ʹ, 
by using HOT theory. 
It may be surprising that a naturalistic theory of consciousness predicts conditions of 
satisfaction that, were they met, would require metaphysical commitments that can’t be 
accounted for naturalistically. This outcome of C1 and C2 leads to my third claim: 
 
C3: Because theory (a) predicts libertarian conditions of satisfaction (as claimed in C1 and 
C2), but the criterion that (a) is naturalistic entails a naturalistic metaphysics such that 
those libertarian conditions of satisfaction cannot be met, (a) predicts that our experience 
of free will is not veridical, but illusory. 
 
This claim is a variety of free will skepticism, the thesis that we lack metaphysical free 
will. My overall argument and this skeptical conclusion will help to answer some of my initial 
phenomenological questions. Defending C3 in light of C1ʹ establishes that no, I do not in fact 
choose freely. And why is it that I still feel like I choose freely? That question will be answered 
by producing the actual items of content in the experience of free will in the course of using 
HOT theory to defend C1ʹ and C2. My skeptical conclusion also invites new questions, such as 
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what it means to be a moral agent who is not free. I will end by addressing such questions and 
other possible concerns with my argument and its skeptical conclusion, as well as considering 
advantages of taking it up. 
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2 ROSENTHAL’S HOT THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
HOT theory provides explanations of the mental states involved in phenomenal conscious 
experience, as well as a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in making mental states 
conscious and introspecting about those conscious states. In order to apply this theory to 
particular conscious experiences, such as the experience of free will, it’s important to understand 
the terminology and tools of its framework for explaining conscious experiences. It’s also 
important to understand the strong empirical support behind HOT theory, which motivates my 
use of it here to partially defend the first claim of my argument. I’ll provide explanations of both 
HOT theory’s framework and its empirical support in this section. 
2.1 Understanding HOT Theory 
The basic unit in David Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness is a mental state such as a 
thought, belief, or percept. He defines a mental state as any state that has intentional properties, 
phenomenal properties, or both (Rosenthal, 1986, pp. 332–333). Phenomenal properties are what 
give certain mental states their unique experiential qualities, or what it’s like to be in that mental 
state (Nagel, 1974). When I see a passing bicyclist with a bike whose paint reflects wavelengths 
corresponding to the color red, I mentally experience redness; that redness is a phenomenal 
property of the mental state(s) involved. Intentional properties are those of directedness or 
aboutness. If I have a thought directed at or about an object, that thought has an intentional 
property. In Searle’s (1983) parlance, intentional properties have conditions of satisfaction. Just 
as with my discussion of conditions of satisfaction above, if I have an intentional mental state 
that is directed at or about an object that isn’t there, the mental state fails to meet its conditions of 
satisfaction. 
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With this definition of a mental state, Rosenthal is able to define conscious states as 
“simply mental states we are conscious of being in.” Furthermore, “our being conscious of 
something is just a matter of our having a thought of some sort about it” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 
335). When we have a higher-order thought about mental states in this way, we say that the 
higher-order thought is representing the other mental states. 
By virtue of this representation, these higher-order thoughts, or HOTs (Rosenthal, 1997, 
2005), are able to make a variety of first-order mental states conscious to us. Saying that the 
HOT makes the first-order state conscious shouldn’t be taken as implying some action on the 
part of a HOT. As Giustina and Kriegal put it, 
in Rosenthal’s theory this higher-order thought does not do anything to the lower-order 
state in order to make it conscious. It does not bring about any intrinsic change in that 
state that renders that state conscious. Rather, the higher-order thought makes the lower-
order state conscious simply by being there. It is in this sense that consciousness is, in 
Rosenthal’s theory, a relational rather than intrinsic property of conscious states. 
(Giustina & Kriegel, forthcoming, p. 2) 
First-order mental states can be visual percepts, memories, thoughts, etc. When I see the 
red bike in front of me, I will have first-order mental states involving specific shades of red 
associated with underlying physical wavelengths of light, contours of the edges of the object, 
conceptual ties between those shades and contours representing certain colors and shapes, and 
perhaps short-term or long-term memories of experiences with other objects having similar 
properties. Some of these first-order states have phenomenal properties, some intentional 
properties, and some both. If a mental state is not represented by a HOT it is not conscious; thus 
8 
first-order states with either phenomenal or intentional properties may be either conscious or 
unconscious. 
A single HOT can also represent groups or “bunches” of first-order states. In this way 
“HOTs often unify into a single awareness a large bunch of experiences” (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 
328). I don’t just experience a mess of lower-visible-spectrum shades of varying intensity 
gathered in curves against a background, I experience these various first-order states as a red 
bicycle. That unity of experience requires that the lower-order states which are represented by a 
single HOT include not just raw percepts but also appropriate concepts and memories related to 
past percepts. For someone who has ridden a bicycle before, the phenomenology of seeing the 
red bike is not just that it is a red framework of metal but that it is a thing to sit on and ride. 
When states with phenomenal properties are made conscious, we have a conscious 
phenomenal experience; for example, if a HOT represents first-order visual percepts caused by a 
red object in front of me, I’ll consciously experience redness. So, the content of an experience, 
its conscious phenomenology, is the result of a HOT representing first-order states with 
phenomenal properties. It may seem easy at this point to map HOTs to conscious experiences 
and first-order states to the content of the experiences, but this would be a mistake. Conscious 
experiences and their content explain mental processes at a more abstract level than a theory of 
consciousness such as HOT theory does. That is, HOT theory is a more fine-grained explanation 
of mental processes, in that a conscious experience and its content are a matter of a HOT 
representing first-order states. Saying that a conscious experience has certain phenomenal 
content is saying that first-order states with certain phenomenal properties are made conscious by 
a HOT’s representation. This relationship between content and first-order states is what allows 
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HOT theory to serve as our theory (a): phenomenal content is present in an experience when 
first-order states with corresponding phenomenal properties are represented by a HOT. 
In addition to the HOTs I’ve described so far, we can have even higher-order thoughts 
when we introspect. During introspection, a third-order HOT represents the second-order HOT 
(Rosenthal, 1997, p. 730). While a second-order HOT makes me aware of being in a mental 
state, a third-order introspective HOT makes me aware that I am aware of it. That third-order 
HOT makes the second-order HOT conscious to me, including its representation of first-order 
HOTs and their properties and relations. HOT theory thus clearly distinguishes between our in-
the-moment stream of consciousness and the more focused introspective consciousness that we 
sometimes employ (Rosenthal, 1986, pp. 336–337). 
An important point that this account of introspection brings out is that all mental states 
are unconscious without an accompanying HOT. A first-order state alone is unconscious until it 
is represented by a HOT, and when the second-order HOT represents its first-order states, it is 
making them and not itself conscious. That second-order HOT itself is unconscious until it too is 
represented by a HOT, as during introspection (Rosenthal, 1986, pp. 337–338). This is another 
reason why HOTs can’t be mapped to conscious experiences: HOTs are not usually conscious. 
This economy of conscious states makes sense if we consider the plethora of first-order 
mental states that must guide our everyday actions. While some actions may require that we be 
conscious of them, we also get a lot done by having things offloaded to unconscious habit or 
instinct; walking or riding a bike is a largely unconscious action, leaving us able to consciously 
enjoy our surroundings as we do so. Similarly, it is impossible to be introspectively aware of 
everything we are conscious of, and so not all of our second-order HOTs can be conscious at 
once. Only by employing introspection and its third-order HOTs are we aware of those second-
10 
order HOTs. This tendency for HOTs to be unconscious is what gives consciousness its 
immediate, transparent quality: the mental mechanisms producing the conscious state are 
themselves usually unconscious, and we are normally only aware of that immediate, flowing 
stream of consciousness, the consciousness of first-order states. 
The taxonomy of HOT theory, then, includes: 
 
• mental states: those states that are intentional and/or phenomenal 
• first-order state: a lowest-order mental state such as a visual percept or a memory 
• conscious states: mental states that are represented by higher-order thoughts 
• higher-order thought (HOT): a mental state at a higher order than the state (or group of 
states) it represents and thereby makes conscious; usually itself unconscious 
• introspective thought: a HOT representing another HOT (or group of HOTs) thereby 
making the latter conscious 
 
2.2 Empirical support for HOT theory 
There are many theories of consciousness, some naturalistic and some not. While there 
are likewise many conceptions of naturalism, I’ve taken naturalism to be the view that all of 
reality is the interaction of matter according to natural laws and forces, that “reality is exhausted 
by nature” (Papineau, 2020). Non-naturalistic theories might try to explain consciousness in 
terms of special mental substances, but the kind of naturalist I’ve described would likely deny 
this and say that there are only physical substances, and so mental states must be described 
entirely in physical terms. Theories that adopt this physicalism about consciousness generally 
aim to explain mental states in terms of brain states. There are several theories that do this with 
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varying degrees of success, where we measure that success by the confirmation of experimental 
studies of the brain. While there have been debates about exactly what the empirical data means 
for HOT theory and its competitors,1 and much more needs to be done to design empirical 
studies that will test these theories, there is work that strongly supports HOT theory as the 
leading theory among naturalistic theories of consciousness. 
I’ll focus especially on the work of Hakwan Lau and his collaborators. Lau and Rosenthal 
co-authored a study (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) that compares a variety of experiments which 
distinguish HOT theory from its competitors. The study assumes, first of all, that higher-order 
representations are processed by the prefrontal cortex, while first-order states are the domain of 
lower-level processes, such as the processing of visual inputs by the visual cortex. These 
experiments then measure prefrontal activity in scenarios where conscious awareness is required 
but successful task performance is not, “because these cases most crucially distinguish the 
higher-order view from its alternatives” (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, p. 371). For example, first-
order theories say that the presence of first-order states are sufficient for consciousness. We 
know experimentally that successful task performance is possible without the help of the 
prefrontal cortex, by relying on lower-level processes and their first-order states alone. So, one 
possible prediction of first-order theories is that conscious awareness goes hand in hand with 
successful task performance. However, there is also strong evidence that conscious awareness is 
associated with prefrontal activation. This suggests that consciousness should not be required for 
successful task performance. This is better explained by HOT theory’s reliance on higher-order 
representations for consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, p. 366–367). So, while they 
encourage additional work to verify their conclusions, the authors find the experimental data to 
                                                 
1 See especially the 2011 exchange between Block and Rosenthal cited below, which is also a good summary of 
some general objections to HOT theory and Rosenthal’s responses to those objections. 
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support HOT theory’s prediction (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, p. 371). In a similar manner, Joseph 
LeDoux and Richard Brown (2017) find an adaptation of HOT theory to better support LeDoux’s 
empirical work on emotion than competing theories. 
Lau and Brown (2019) address one of the primary criticisms of HOT theory which is that 
it fails to account for scenarios where a subject has a conscious experience without 
corresponding first-order states, a logical possibility under the theory. First-order theories, on the 
other hand, are argued to avoid this problem, since under those theories conscious experiences 
consist only of first-order states (Block, 2011b, 2011a; Rosenthal, 2011). In response, the authors 
cite clinical cases involving irregular visual experiences, such as the Rare Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome cases in which the subject has visually phenomenal experiences in the form of 
hallucinations but without an intact primary visual cortex. Because the competing first-order 
theory might rely on first-order mental states corresponding to an intact visual cortex, it can’t 
account for such experiences. While it may seem counterintuitive to say that a HOT can 
represent a first-order state that is not present, the authors consider a variety of ways it can 
indeed represent such a state, and conclude that “a version of the standard higher-order approach 
should be considered less problematical than the first-order view” (Lau & Brown, 2019, p. 25). 
Finally, Brown, et al. (2019) give an even deeper look at the relationship between HOTs 
and the prefrontal cortex, as well as describing how HOT theory offers a good middle ground 
between theories that they think are too conceptually simple or too complex compared to what 
we know about the brain’s processes. On the too-simple end are first-order theories; on the too-
complex are theories like Global Workspace Theory (GWT). GWT says that conscious 
experiences are a matter of first-order states being globally broadcasted, where that “conscious 
sensory content […] is distributed widely to a decentralized ‘audience’ of expert networks” such 
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as memory, cognition, etc. (Baars, 2005, p. 47). This view of consciousness requires then that 
successful task performance be linked to consciousness in the form of global broadcasting of the 
first-order states in question. There are empirical considerations that make this view problematic. 
For example, the authors discuss blindsight patients, who are patients that have no visual 
phenomenal experiences but are still able to reliably detect visual stimuli. If GWT were correct, 
the first-order visual stimuli used to successfully complete the task would be globally broadcast, 
creating a conscious experience (Brown, et al., 2019, p. 8). Since such experiences do not occur 
for blindsight patients, GWT cannot be correct. HOT theory on the other hand is able to explain 
such phenomena since successful task performance and conscious experience are decoupled. 
This empirical support gives us reasons to further develop HOT theory, as well as reasons 
to feel encouraged to apply it to specific areas in consciousness research. That is what I’ll be 
doing here, by using it as the theory of consciousness (a) that allows me to examine the content 
of the experience of free will. I’ll do so by going through a list (b) of candidate items of content 
and saying which content is compatible with the structure of consciousness as given by HOT 
theory. My next step, then, will be to gather that list of candidate items of content. 
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3 THE FEATURES OF FREE WILL EXPERIENCES 
Thus far I have been assuming that our phenomenology of free will involves a rich 
variety of content for us to introspect and reason about. That makes my account an example of 
what Tim Bayne calls a liberal account of the phenomenology of agency. A strictly conservative 
account, on the other hand, says that the experience of agency lacks the content to support this 
richer phenomenology, but instead only includes minimal content related to an agent’s action 
(Bayne, 2008). I want to not only assume but also defend the liberal position. So, one way to 
read my overall argument is that it is an argument in favor of a liberal account of agential 
phenomenology, that regardless of the metaphysical status of free will, our experience of free 
will does involve rich content. 
To provide this account, I’ll first look to the recent literature to identify two primary 
features of the free will experience. I’ll borrow their names from Nahmias, et al. (2004), 
although they intersect closely with the distinctions drawn by Terry Horgan (2015). The first is 
the idea that we as agents are the causal source of our choices, and the second is our ability to do 
otherwise when we choose to act. Both libertarians and compatibilists offer interpretations of 
each feature, and both propose different phenomenal content for each feature. So, I’ll first 
describe each feature in neutral terms that members of both camps generally agree with, and then 
I’ll offer both a libertarian and a compatibilist interpretation of the content of the feature at hand. 
The presence of the content given by these interpretations will then be considered in §4. 
3.1 Agent as cause 
When you choose to do something, you experience yourself as doing it; when you move, 
your experience is of “your arm, hand, and fingers as being moved by you yourself,” as Horgan 
puts it (2015, p. 35). That is, you experience yourself, the agent, as the cause of your choice to 
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move. This feature includes the perception of our bodies, but also of other parts of ourselves, 
including our memories, dispositions, or whatever else we take to be required for defining 
selfhood. We experience ourselves and our choices as involved in the causation of the action in 
some way, and so we experience ourselves as a part of the action (Bayne, 2008). 
I said above that some libertarians are seen as making metaphysical claims that can’t be 
accounted for naturalistically. This is especially true of agent-causal libertarians, and this is the 
type of libertarianism I’ll be addressing unless otherwise noted. This libertarian has a richer, 
more unitary view of the self compared to the compatibilist, and attributes to that self strong 
powers of causation. In keeping with Bayne’s (2008) distinction between liberal and 
conservative agential phenomenology, I’ll refer to the phenomenally richer self as a liberal self. 
In this view, we have “an experience of the self as a cause, where the causal role of the self is not 
to be understood as derivative on or reducible to the causal role of the self’s mental states” 
(Bayne, 2008, p. 193). This experience of the causal role of the agent includes the sense that the 
agent possesses the almost godlike powers of being an uncaused cause, that “freedom consists in 
being an undetermined determinant of one’s action” (Clarke, 1993, p. 194). One item of content 
of the libertarian experience, then, is that the agent is a liberal self. Another is that this self seems 
to have a primary causal role. Furthermore, that the agent’s experience of having free will 
includes the impression of initiating a new causal chain of events in a way that couldn’t have 
been caused or predicted before the agent chose to act. 
Horgan says that “such terminology seems phenomenologically apt regardless of what 
one thinks about the intelligibility and credibility of metaphysical libertarianism” (Horgan, 2015, 
p. 36). This apparent aptness makes it difficult for the compatibilist to offer a satisfying 
interpretation of the phenomenology involved. One compatibilist approach is to “analyse free 
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actions (roughly and with caveats) as actions appropriately caused by the agent’s beliefs and 
desires” (Nahmias, et al., 2004, p. 167). These beliefs and desires of the agent would then be 
experienced as having the primary causal role, rather than the agent themselves. The 
compatibilists can thereby put the burden back on the libertarian “to show that we actually have a 
‘thick’ experience of ourselves as agent-causes that goes beyond our experience of our mental 
states causing our decisions and actions” (Nahmias, et al., 2004, p. 167). This “thick” experience 
is the experience of a liberal self, and so this compatibilist response is another form of the 
conservative vs. liberal debate about the content of free will experiences. 
A more liberal compatibilist response would be to accept aspects of libertarian 
phenomenology of the self but reject libertarian metaphysics. For example, what we might call 
“liberal self skepticism” would allow the compatibilist to accept that we experience a liberal self 
even though the conditions of satisfaction of that experience are not met. This would still allow 
the compatibilist to reject other aspects of libertarian phenomenology, and to reject free will 
skepticism. In turn, a compatibilist’s acceptance of liberal self phenomenology does not pose a 
problem for my defense of libertarian conditions of satisfaction and of free will skepticism, as 
I’ll explain in §4–5. 
3.2 Ability to do otherwise 
When we make a choice, we experience ourselves as choosing among more than one 
option. Included in that experience is the notion that we could have done otherwise than we have 
done. In Horgan’s (2015) words, our experience contains a “core optionality.” This feature is 
also described as “openness” about our future in the moment before and during our action (Deery 
& Nahmias, forthcoming). Robert Kane has used Borges’s (1944/1993) imagery to describe this 
openness as a “garden of forking paths” from which we choose (Kane, 2005, p. 7). 
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A libertarian might describe this experience of openness as one in which “an action is 
free only if, given all conditions as they are at and up until the moment of choice, the agent is 
able to act or choose in more than one way” (Nahmias, et al., 2004, p. 165). This description 
introduces two items of libertarian content: the feeling that we have the ability to choose from 
among more than one option, and the feeling that our choice could be different even if all 
conditions are held fixed right up until we choose. Furthermore, one has the sense that it is “up to 
oneself whether or not one does the thing one does” (Clarke, 2019, pp. 756–757). This feeling of 
the choice being up to oneself is a third libertarian item of content for the feature of the ability to 
do otherwise. So, the experience of libertarian free choice is that it is “up to you whether or not 
to perform” the chosen action, such that “you could have done otherwise” (Horgan, 2015, p. 36, 
see also 2007b; Kane, 1996, p. 44ff.). Some studies on folk intuitions, the intuitions that 
everyday non-philosophers have about free will experiences, support such interpretations of this 
feature (see, e.g., Deery, et al., 2013, p. 143). 
The compatibilist disagrees about the content associated with the feature of the ability to 
do otherwise. For example, one might instead offer a conceptual interpretation of the word 
‘ability’ in terms of dispositions (Deery, et al., 2013, p. 144; Vihvelin, 2004). A compatibilist 
with this dispositional view might claim that there is an item of content for the sense that we 
have a disposition to do otherwise than we have done. Compatibilists might similarly say that the 
feeling of our choices being up to us is actually the feeling that we’re appropriately “responsive 
to reasons” for making the choice (Nahmias, et al., 2004, p. 165n5). Finally, they might take the 
conservative stance toward the phenomenal content and deny the libertarian claim that this 
feature requires the experience of all conditions being held fixed until the agent has made the 
choice (Nahmias, et al., 2004, p. 166).  
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4 HOT THEORY AND LIBERTARIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 
In order to better analyze the findings of the literature I’ve reviewed, I’ve organized them into 
table form, where the rows are the items of content of the two features of the experience of free 
will, and the columns correspond to the libertarian vs. compatibilism interpretations of each item 
of content: 
 
Table 1: Features of the experience of free will 
 Libertarian Compatibilist 
Agent as 
cause 
Agent is a liberal self Agent is either a liberal or non-
liberal self 
 Agent has primary causal role Agent’s beliefs and desires have 
primary causal role 
 Agent is an uncaused cause No content of being an uncaused 
cause 
Ability to 
do otherwise 
Choice is up to the agent Choice is a response to agent’s 
reasons 
 Agent has ability to choose among 
multiple options 
Agent has disposition to do 
otherwise 
 Choice could be different even if 
conditions hold fixed 
No content of choice being able to 
be different 
 
There are a few things to note about these items of content and the way I’ve structured 
them. First, the compatibilist column contains fewer claims of candidate items of content. This 
relative sparseness isn’t surprising given the compatibilist’s tendency to take up a more 
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conservative stance about content. Having more items of content does, however, provide more 
opportunities for the libertarian to show that an item of content is present. 
In order to use HOT theory to demonstrate that the experience of free will has libertarian 
conditions of satisfaction, I don’t need to show that there are no compatibilist items of content 
present. The libertarian would likely agree that at least some of the content in the compatibilist 
column is present in the experience of free will, but they would hold that none of the content in 
the compatibilist column is sufficient to say that someone has had a free will experience. The 
compatibilist in turn might try to say that none of the content in the libertarian column is 
necessary for a free will experience. So, to defend a libertarian free will experience against such 
a compatibilist, I only need to show that one item in the libertarian column is present in the 
experience of free will. 
However, the compatibilist might also accept portions of the libertarian content, such as 
the liberal self, but deny the rest. As such, I’ll show that all six items of libertarian content are 
present in the experience. My case, though, will be especially underpinned by the first item in the 
libertarian column, the experience of being an agent as a liberal self. This is in part because there 
is a close relationship between the two features of the experience of free will, the agent as cause 
and the ability to do otherwise. As Horgan puts it, the two features are “intimately bound up” 
together (2015, p. 37). HOT theory will help us to see why that is. So, I’ll account for the first 
item in the list by way of HOT theory’s support for experiencing oneself as a liberal self, and 
then proceed to account for the rest of the content in light of those findings. 
4.1 Agent as cause 
Agent as a liberal self: When we choose to act we experience ourselves as being an 
agent, and the libertarian takes up a rich, unitary view of this agential self, which I’ve called a 
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liberal self. HOT theory provides support that we do indeed experience a liberal self. Just as a 
HOT is able to represent a unified conscious awareness of anything by representing a group of 
first-order states, it is able to represent a unified sense of self. 
First, each HOT involves a “minimal concept of self” in that it represents a relationship 
between some concept of self and the conscious state in question (Rosenthal, 1997, p. 741). This 
minimal concept of self need not be very sophisticated and is compatible with the kind of 
consciousness we sometimes want to attribute to infants or non-human animals. On its own this 
minimal self doesn’t give us the liberal self required by the libertarian view. When combined 
with other tools that HOT theory gives us, however, this minimal concept of self contributes to 
the experience of having that richer sense of a liberal self. 
We use a variety of personal markers to identify ourselves. These self markers are based 
on our memories, beliefs, physical makeup, etc., and are first-order mental states with 
phenomenal properties that are available to conscious thought when needed. So, when I choose 
to go for a walk, the experience of that choice is a HOT which represents and connects a variety 
of first-order self markers, perhaps my past choices to go on walks, my body’s energy level at 
that moment, memories of where I have and haven’t walked before, etc. When I choose to turn 
down a new path on my walk, new self markers come into play, associated with the others via 
memory and the self markers still in play. 
In other words, when a HOT represents a mental state as being conscious, that 
representation includes a reference to the minimal concept of self in the form of some minimal 
set of these self markers, but also to a larger group of whichever of these markers are relevant to 
the conscious experience at hand (such as choosing to go for a walk). This larger group will 
include concepts necessary for that liberal self, including a sense of continuity over time and 
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space, at least in the form of associations between our memories and our present mentally-
represented bodily states. The combination of the phenomenal properties of each first-order state 
involved will then lend to every conscious act a rich phenomenal experience of being a self. This 
sense of self doesn’t need to include every possible self marker, but only those relevant to the 
task at hand. As the task evolves or as we take on new tasks, these markers will be united with 
additional self markers and slough off unnecessary ones. As Rosenthal puts it, 
For any new first-person thought, the reference that thought makes to oneself is secured 
by appeal to what other, prior first-person thoughts have referred to, and this process 
gradually enlarges the stock of self-identifying thoughts available to secure such 
reference. (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 335) 
The set of self markers can thus be seen as a continuous and evolving set, whose common 
members are at least those markers comprising the minimal concept of self. The inclusion of this 
set of markers in every conscious experience lends to us the experience of being a rich, unitary 
self: a liberal self. 
When I make the choice, then, the HOT doesn’t merely represent the choice as a 
conscious mental state; it represents that I am the one in that mental state, that I, as a liberal self, 
am the one making the choice. This description makes no metaphysical commitment about the 
nature of the self (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 351). In particular, it should not be taken as a claim that 
there is actually some simple, unitary self making the choice. In fact, it claims that the content 
associated with the experience of selfhood is complex, in that it is comprised of many first-order 
states, the self markers. What HOT theory does is explain why it is that I experience myself as a 
unitary self, and it explains why I experience myself as the one having my conscious experiences: 
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I “identify the individual to which each HOT assigns its target as being the same from one HOT 
to the next” (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 337). 
Since all of my conscious mental states contain a reference to the minimal concept of 
self, and since all conscious states have access to the liberal self via the full set of first-order self 
markers, all of our choices involve the experience of a liberal self in a way that is consistent with 
the libertarian phenomenological claim. That is, this liberal self is the libertarian agent. 
This means that, according to HOT theory, compatibilists who hold something like a 
Humean bundle theory about their experience of selfhood are misdescribing their 
phenomenology. However, as explained in the previous section, the compatibilist can instead 
accept the liberal self view while still resisting the remaining libertarian items of content. 
Primary causal role: Another libertarian phenomenological claim is that this liberal self 
has a primary causal role, in that the agent causes the choice and subsequent action rather than 
just the agent’s mental states (such as beliefs or desires). This isn’t to say that mental states like 
beliefs and desires play no causal role, but that they only do so as a part of a liberal self. 
When I choose to go for a walk, I might say that I do so purely because I want to, and 
that nothing else caused me to do so. However, for the libertarian it isn’t sufficient to say that it 
is only my desire to go for a walk that causes me to do so. That desire functions only as a 
property of an agent, myself. It is because I as an agent desire to go for a walk that I choose to go 
for a walk. 
Every time we consciously choose to act, the HOT making the choice conscious 
represents a group of mental states that also includes markers of the self, some of which are our 
beliefs and desires. It is never the case, however, that we make a choice wherein mere beliefs or 
desires are represented by a HOT in the absence of the liberal self. Since the agent’s liberal self 
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will always be present in the experience, and since the desires belong to the agent, the agent’s 
liberal self is experienced as being primary rather than the agent’s desires. Therefore, the 
phenomenology will always be that of the agent as the primary cause of the choice in question. 
Uncaused cause: There is an even stronger sort of content associated with the 
phenomenology of being an agent with a primary causal role, which is that of being an uncaused 
cause. To be a cause that is not itself caused is to make a break in the unfolding of the causal 
chain of the universe, to start a new causal chain. Prior to my kicking the rock while walking 
down the hill, I might imagine it to have moved from place to place only ever in response to 
states and events that started at the Big Bang and unfolded (at least macroscopically) 
deterministically since then. When I choose to kick it, a strong version of libertarianism would 
claim, I experience myself as starting a new causal chain of events. 
HOT theory predicts that this is exactly what we would experience. In the moment of 
choice we are consciously aware of only those self markers required for the action at hand, 
including beliefs and desires immediately relevant to the choice, and assume a primary causal 
role for that liberal self while being unconscious of other first-order states having a causal role. 
In Rosenthal’s words, 
Because our mental states are not all conscious, we are seldom if ever conscious of all the 
mental antecedents of our conscious states. And conscious desires and intentions whose 
mental antecedents we are not conscious of seem to us to be spontaneous and uncaused. 
(Rosenthal, 2003, pp. 350–351) 
The resulting phenomenal content is of ourselves being an uncaused cause: our causal 
role is conscious for us, but any antecedent causes of that causal role are not conscious for us. 
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This explanation of conscious and unconscious states applies equally to any outside 
forces that empirical work might tell us are causally influencing our choices. If those processes 
are a result of a deterministic unfolding of events including my genetic history and the 
environment in which I was raised, then ultimately my choice was entirely determined. However, 
that set of deterministic influences would not be represented in my experience. Due to HOT 
theory’s economy of conscious mental states, in order to be conscious of a choice the only states 
I would need to have represented are those necessary for the experience of the choice itself. In 
the case of going for a walk, all I need to be conscious of is the desire to go for a walk, my 
energy level, etc., as appropriate to the task at hand. 
While this explanation covers a significant portion of the phenomenology of being an 
uncaused cause, it misses a nuance. As Terry Horgan puts it, “Not presenting one’s behavior as 
causally determined by prior conditions” is different from “Presenting one’s behavior as not 
causally determined by prior conditions” (Horgan, 2015, p. 56). I haven’t addressed the latter. To 
do so will require some concepts I haven’t yet touched upon, and so I will return to the defense 
of this item of content at the end of the following section. 
4.2 Ability to do otherwise 
Choice is up to the agent: With these insights into the phenomenology of agent causation, 
it is easier to understand the phenomenology of our ability to do otherwise. When I choose to go 
for a walk, I do so in part because the choice is mine, and in this way I experience the choice as 
up to me. The libertarian asserts that it is not sufficient to say that in choosing to go for a walk I 
feel like I am responding to reasons for going for a walk, where those reasons are that I want to 
stay fit, need some fresh air, am feeling bored, etc. For the libertarian, this responsiveness does 
not cover the phenomenal content of the choice being up to me. 
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Again, this libertarian interpretation of the content is supported by the idea of the liberal 
self that HOT theory predicts is involved in all conscious choices. As with beliefs and desires, 
when my reasons are conscious but their causes are not, I will experience my liberal self as being 
primary, and so I will experience the choice to act one way or another, or whether or not to act, 
as being ultimately up to me and not merely a matter of my responsiveness to reasons. 
Ability to choose among multiple options: Although the HOT representing a choice will 
not encompass all of the causal factors going into the decision and all their possible outcomes, it 
can represent the availability of an option itself. When I come to a literal fork in the path and 
need to choose which way to go, it may be that the brain states corresponding to a decision to act 
are engaged before I become conscious that I have chosen, and then I begin walking (Rosenthal, 
2003, p. 350n38). Upon walking in one direction, the HOT representing my choice will represent 
the option chosen, the other possible options (here, the fork not taken), and all my liberal self 
markers, so that my experience is of myself as having the ability to choose from among the 
available options. In other words, to consciously experience a choice, all we need be conscious 
of is the optionality and not the true causal source of the choice. This source may be the agent, 
some event in the agent’s brain, or causally deterministic factors outside and inside the agent. It’s 
not manifest in the phenomenology which of these is the case, but the experience of optionality 
is manifest. 
As mentioned earlier, one way for the compatibilist to explain away the metaphysical 
ability to do otherwise is that we instead possess dispositions to do otherwise (Vihvelin, 2004). 
However, when it comes to the phenomenology, one study by Deery, et al. denies that this is 
how the layperson experiences choice. Rather than saying that “an ability to act is a disposition, 
or a bundle of dispositions,” participants in the study “tended to interpret their agentive 
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experience in terms of an ability to do otherwise, and they interpreted that ability 
incompatibilistically” (Deery, et al., 2013, pp. 144–145). That subjects do not experience the 
ability to do otherwise dispositionally can be explained in terms of HOT theory. A dispositional 
account of ability does not satisfy the phenomenal experience because the items of content 
related to the experience of optionality must also be accounted for. I do have certain dispositions 
to choose amongst options, but when it comes down to the choice, those dispositions will be 
represented by a HOT alongside other first-order states, including the availability of multiple 
options as described above. Because of this representation of optionality itself, when making a 
choice I can’t help but be presented with the phenomenal content of multiple options being 
available to me, and so the dispositional account alone fails to do justice to the phenomenology. 
Choice could be different even if conditions hold fixed: When we choose, the libertarian 
claims, we can imagine that if the choice could be replayed several times over with the same 
input conditions, the output choice may be different from one iteration to the next. If I my entire 
life history, and indeed the history of the entire universe, were held fixed, I would still be able to 
choose something different each time. When I choose, I cause that choice, and I could have 
caused a different choice even with all conditions holding fixed until the moment of choice. 
The ability of HOTs to represent the optionality of a choice, as described above, is an 
important part of this item of content. Again, the group of first-order states involved in my 
conscious choice does not include anything more than it needs to include, but it does include that 
optionality. It also includes first-order states of memories and concepts that represent my current 
state of affairs and life history. A HOT’s representation of both this history and this optionality 
produces the phenomenology of a choice with perceived initial conditions that do not change to 
account for a difference in choice, but also the phenomenology of all relevant options being open 
27 
to me equally. At the moment of choice I resolve upon a single option and experience a change 
in my life history, but up until that point I experience all conditions as holding fixed. 
It is this explanation, also, that allows me to continue my defense of the phenomenology 
of being an uncaused cause. As explained above, Horgan (2015) emphasizes the difference 
between not experiencing our behavior as caused, and experiencing our behavior as not caused. I 
can now show that both are present in the experience of free will. Because I experience 
conditions as holding fixed until the moment of choice, when I experience myself as being the 
cause of a choice between x and y I also experience myself as not being caused to choose x or y. 
So, the HOT involved in the choice doesn’t represent first-order states associated with the prior 
deterministic factors that cause me to choose, which means that I fail to experience myself as 
caused. At the same time, the HOT involved represents first-order states associated with the 
perceived unchanging initial conditions of my choice, as well as first-order states associated with 
my liberal self. Since I experience the initial conditions as unchanging, I also experience myself 
as unaffected by them; that is, they do not cause me to do anything. I experience myself as the 
only determining factor in the choice between x and y, and so I experience myself as uncaused. 
Thus I am an uncaused cause of my choices both in Horgan’s (2015) first and second senses. 
4.3 Summary of the experience of free will 
The discussion above defends my claims C1ʹ and C2. The output of the defense of C1ʹ is 
a list of items of content present in the experience of free will according to HOT theory. That list 
includes the following: 
 
1. The agent is a liberal self 
2. The agent has the primary causal role in making choices 
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3. The agent’s beliefs and desires have a lesser causal role 
4. The agent is an uncaused cause 
5. A choice is up to the agent 
6. A choice is a matter of responsiveness to reasons, but only as a part of the agent 
7. An agent has the ability to choose among multiple options 
8. A choice could be different even if all conditions hold fixed until the moment of choice 
 
Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are my six initial libertarian claims of content. There are also 
some compatibilist items of content are present, as expected. As I pointed out earlier, I only need 
to show that one of the libertarian items of content is present in the experience of free will in 
order to defend C2, the claim that the experience of free will has libertarian conditions of 
satisfaction. In addition, for the compatibilist who accepts item 1 but rejects the rest, I have also 
defended the presence of all six libertarian items. Therefore, I have defended C2. 
At the moment of conscious choice, then, a HOT will represent a group of first-order 
mental states including the following: self markers relevant to the task at hand, such that I 
experience myself as choosing; first-order states relevant to the causation of the event, such as 
my beliefs and desires; visual, auditory, and other percepts relevant to the successful 
performance of the action. What are not rendered conscious are the following: first-order beliefs, 
desires, or instincts that primarily cause the choice; causes prior to those unconscious first-order 
states; changes in the conditions of those first-order states that lead to different choices. “The 
sense we have of free agency results from our failure to be conscious of all our mental states,” 
Rosenthal says (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 351). I have used HOT theory to show that that sense we 
have is a libertarian sense. That is, the product of a phenomenally liberal self interacting with 
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these conscious and unconscious states in the way that HOT theory predicts is an experience of 
choice with a richly libertarian phenomenology.  
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5 SKEPTICISM: CONCERNS AND ADVANTAGES 
The defense of my skeptical claim C3 follows naturally from the above defenses of my first two 
claims. We assume that we are in a world described by naturalism. HOT theory meets the criteria 
of (a), including being naturalistic. HOT theory is also able to be used to defend C1 and C2, 
which establishes that we have libertarian conditions of satisfaction, and so a libertarian 
phenomenology of free will. However, libertarian metaphysics do not hold in a world described 
by naturalism. If we have a libertarian phenomenology of free will but lack libertarian 
metaphysics, then we do not have free will. Therefore, C3 holds, and the experience of free will 
is illusory. 
There have been many claims of free will skepticism, and with them come difficult 
questions such as those I mentioned in the introduction. The most immediate of these, if not the 
most critical, is the question of why it is that we still feel free. My defense of C1ʹ and C2 
provides an explanation: HOTs represent us as being in first-order states that produce content for 
experiences with libertarian conditions of satisfaction. To say that we have libertarian conditions 
of satisfaction is to say that we have a libertarian phenomenology. To say that we have this 
phenomenology is to say that we feel like we are free in the liberal sense described by 
libertarianism. 
My skeptical conclusion runs counter to both compatibilism and libertarianism: 
compatibilism in that the conditions of satisfaction are libertarian, and libertarianism in that the 
conditions of satisfaction cannot be met. As such, they will both offer responses to my argument. 
Many libertarians will agree with my conclusion about the phenomenology but will tend 
to reject the naturalistic metaphysical goals of my argument. This is especially true of the agent-
causal libertarian. That position will result in an impasse. For the naturalist, unless the libertarian 
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can give either a cohesive naturalistic metaphysics that matches the phenomenology or a stronger 
argument for a non-naturalistic metaphysics, my skeptical conclusion holds. Setting aside agent-
causal libertarianism, there are naturalistic libertarian accounts that may be able to avoid my 
skeptical conclusion (see, e.g., Kane, 1996). However, there are further reasons for doubting that 
such accounts are able to provide us with the kind of freedom we feel like we have (see 
Pereboom & Caruso, 2017, p. 199). 
One possible compatibilist concern is that while I have discussed free will as a matter of 
making choices, we in fact experience various types of choices, each with a different 
phenomenology. For example, Nahmias (2006) describes the process of making a choice after 
we’ve deliberated about our options. The outcome of such deliberation, he says, is either a “close 
call” or a “confident decision” (Nahmias, 2006, p. 629). A close call is a choice where we’re torn 
between the options at hand, and equally desire to choose each. A confident decision is one 
where we have reasons to be completely confident about the option we choose. While my 
account is able to address close calls, the compatibilist might argue, a confident decision does 
not have the phenomenology I’ve described. In particular, “the confident agent would never feel 
the need for [an] unconditional sense of alternative possibilities” (Nahmias, 2006, p. 636). This is 
another way of saying that the experience of free will does not require the content of the ability 
to choose among multiple options. However, I’ve established in my defense of that item of 
content that every choice will contain the representation of optionality. Even the highest degree 
of confidence will not remove this optionality from the experience. This is especially clear in 
light of my defense of the choice being able to be different even if conditions hold fixed. The 
confident agent may feel like they had chosen freely even though their deliberation left them 
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with no other reasonable options, but such an agent would still have an experience that they 
could have, for example, chosen against their best reasons. 
Horgan (2015) offers a compatibilist response to the idea that the conditions of 
satisfaction of free will experiences are libertarian. Horgan describes the introspectability thesis, 
which is that we have the capacity for introspection necessary to say what are the conditions of 
satisfaction for libertarian free will experiences. My argument would be an example of an 
account that relies on the introspectability thesis. Horgan argues against this thesis by attempting 
to show various ways in which our conceptual powers are not great enough to introspect about 
the conditions of satisfaction of free will experiences (Horgan, 2015, p. 55ff.). To explain this 
lack of conceptual power, he describes a geometry problem which we are supposed to see as 
obviously having a definite, calculable answer, but one which we can’t arrive at by introspection 
alone. Horgan thinks that answering the geometry problem is analogous to the attempt to say 
what are the conditions of satisfaction of free will experiences: no matter how much we sit and 
think about the questions, their answers will evade us, even though there are definite answers 
(Horgan, 2007a, pp. 17–18). Horgan’s argument might sound like the conservative stance about 
the content of our experiences that I described above, but it is slightly different. Rather than 
being an argument against the existence of certain kinds of content, Horgan’s argument is against 
our ability to introspect about the conditions of satisfaction of the content of our experiences. 
HOT theory, however, shows us that we do have conceptual powers great enough for that 
kind of introspection. First, it gives us a clear picture of how introspection works in terms of the 
interrelation of mental states. Second, it sets up that economy of mental states, wherein we only 
need to be conscious of those mental states that are appropriate for the task at hand. The 
geometry problem in Horgan’s example is indeed difficult to introspect about, but that is not 
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what our conceptual powers evolved for. We evolved to introspect about our environment and 
our actions relative to it. That is, if there’s anything we do have the conceptual powers to 
introspect about, it is our ability as agents to choose among options. Since we do have those 
introspective powers, Horgan’s argument against the introspectability thesis fails, and what that 
introspection reveals, according to HOT theory, is a phenomenology with libertarian conditions 
of satisfaction. 
But Horgan might answer that this misses the heart of his concern, which could be put 
like this: How is it that any theory that is developed via introspection can capture what it is to 
consciously experience something, including the experience of making a choice freely? Or, more 
to the point, let’s say a compatibilist argues that their experience of free will isn’t libertarian, that 
they just have a different experience of free will than others claim to. That is, the content of the 
compatibilist’s free will experiences would point to a compatibilist metaphysics were they met. 
In that case, what reasons would the compatibilist have for thinking that a theory developed via 
HOT theory’s version of introspection would tell them they are mistaken?2 
The first part of the answer to that is a repetition of what I’ve said above: HOT theory 
provides a rich account of the mechanisms of our introspection, such that if we accept the theory 
we can trust the results of our introspection, including the account of the two features of the 
experience of free will given here. For the concern that the compatibilist is just experiencing 
something different, my answer is the one I gave at the beginning of §4. It isn’t that there aren’t 
compatibilist conditions of satisfaction in a given person’s free will experience, it’s just that 
there are additional conditions as well. The mistake of the compatibilist is not in what they have 
experienced overall, but in what content they have reported as being part of the experience of 
                                                 
2 Personal communication with Eddy Nahmias, October 2019. 
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free will. Here I have given two features of the experience of free will, each with a variety of 
content that HOT theory requires. If HOT theory is accurate, then, it says that the compatibilist is 
failing to properly describe the experience of free will and its conditions of satisfaction, while the 
libertarian is properly describing those conditions. 
Broader objections might be taken to my skeptical conclusion; more questions might 
arise. For example, if we do not have free will, have our past choices meant anything? How 
about our present or future ones? Without free will, can we have the moral status we thought we 
had? If not, what happens to our value system? Could we survive a collapse of our values? 
These questions have an edge of anxiety, and they aren’t answerable by HOT theory, or 
by defenses of claims C1–3. There are, however, some reasons to take up the free will skepticism 
without anxiety, and reasons to see that it is in fact a more desirable view of our agency. 
First, I don’t believe that a collapse of values is something to be worried about. It’s 
feasible that a society aware of its lack of free will would continue to have something like Peter 
Strawson’s reactive attitudes (Strawson, 1962), and so we just would continue to hold each other 
morally responsible, whether or not the theorists say that moral responsibility requires free will. 
Such a position would say that we’re moral creatures, and will continue to be regardless of the 
metaphysics or our understanding of it. But it is also possible that our understanding of the lack 
of free will would indeed have downstream effects that alter our moral status, and I won’t take 
on such a debate here. 
There is a related argument for not being concerned about free will skepticism, however. 
There’s a deeper kind of moral responsibility, an ultimate responsibility that is impossible to 
have without free will. This kind of responsibility is what Galen Strawson said would make us 
deserving, were heaven and hell real, of eternal blessing or torture (Strawson, 1994, p. 9f.). One 
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doesn’t have to believe in heaven or hell to feel like some of our methods of punishment are too 
terrible for creatures that lack free will. An answer to this sensibility is found in Pereboom & 
Caruso (2017). They refer to the ultimate responsibility I’ve described as basic desert moral 
responsibility and define free will in terms of it. They review both compatibilist and libertarian 
possibilities for a metaphysical basis for that free will, and rule out each one. The remaining 
option, they say, is their own version of free will skepticism called hard incompatibilism. 
However, they also acknowledge that 
it is not the philosophical arguments for free will skepticism that are the problem, it is the 
existential angst they create and the fear that relinquishing belief in free will and basic 
desert moral responsibility would undermine morality, negatively affect our interpersonal 
relationships, and leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior. (Pereboom 
& Caruso, 2017, p. 199) 
In response to this angst, they then give us a thorough tour of what our society’s justice 
system might look like if we lacked free will and that ultimate moral responsibility. In lieu of 
harsh punishments they offer a system based on medical quarantine, wherein those who have 
committed crimes are rehabilitated if possible. While there are many concerns about this model 
yet to be worked out,3 it offers a glimpse into an improved society as a result of accepting free 
will skepticism. 
My parting answer to concerns about free will skepticism is a rhetorical extension of the 
other responses I’ve given. Bernard Williams said that the ancient Greek tragedies and other 
“stark fictions” can say something about our moral status that moral philosophy can’t, that there 
is a limit on “the tireless aim of moral philosophy to make the world safe for well-disposed 
                                                 
3 See Pereboom (2017) for an attempt to defend against such concerns. 
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people” (Williams, 2006, p. 59). There’s more than a bit of censure in this statement, since he 
sees much of moral philosophy as covering up, for the sake of well-disposed people, the real 
horrors that much of humanity faces. Moral theories tend to ignore “the very plain fact that 
everything that an agent most cares about typically comes from, and can be ruined by, 
uncontrollable necessity” (Williams, 2006, p. 54). However, I have some hope that moral 
philosophy can overcome this limit, by facing the reality of our situation as starkly as Sophocles. 
We can acknowledge that our actions and those of others are a matter of necessity, that they are 
determined by other factors. My solution to this limit of moral philosophy is in contrast to people 
like Smilansky (2000) who believe that it is critical to maintain the illusion of freedom, that 
without the comfort of that illusion we would buckle under the weight of reality’s necessity. 
Reliance on that comfort is just another way of covering up humanity’s suffering. While we may 
not be capable of countenancing all of that suffering at every moment, our other cognitive 
limitations, such as the economy of mental states that HOT theory describes, already take care of 
that for us. We’re better off introspecting about reality as much as we’re able to, so that we might 
more accurately address the moral issues at hand. 
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